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Compelled Speech and Proportionality
ALEXANDER TSESIS*
This Article argues for a proportional First Amendment approach to compelled
speech jurisprudence. It discusses the evolution of doctrine and how it led to recent
opinions finding unconstitutional consumer protection, health disclosure, and
collective bargaining statutes. In place of the currently formalistic approach, the
Article argues for a transparent balancing of interests to avoid litigants’
opportunistic reliance on categorical First Amendment doctrines. Missing from the
recent decisions that relied on the compelled speech doctrine is any systematic or
contextual weighing of private and public concerns about disclosure regulations.
The Roberts Court has been rather formalistic and categorical in its compelled
speech decisions. It relied on the doctrine to find unconstitutional regulations on
credit card surcharges, prescription privacy, collective bargaining, and health
notices.
Greater context in judicial reasoning would better balance competing interests
and First Amendment values. The compelled speech doctrine should be rethought
with an eye to greater contextual clarity. This can be effectively captured through
means-ends analysis rather than categorical and often inconsistent judicial veto of
federal and state legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has increasingly relied on the First Amendment compelled
speech doctrine to strike laws that require unwilling parties to inform the public of
specified information. The Court has subjected public health, labor, and consumer
protection laws to heightened First Amendment scrutiny.
The compelled speech doctrine has taken on a libertarian flavor that relies on
exacting scrutiny or strict scrutiny to review all content-based regulations.1
Precedents tend to place a thumb on private speech without adequately weighing
countervailing policy aims. Hence, the Court has struck as unconstitutional
legislative efforts to buttress economic, privacy, and collective bargaining
regulations that had an incidental effect on speech. Formalistic features of those
holdings fail to distinguish “speech as speech” from “ordinary social and economic
legislation.”2 A pattern of aggressive First Amendment jurisprudence has produced
jurocentrism inconsistent with judicial modesty.
The current pattern of cases sets rigid methodology that lacks nuanced reflection
on the policies and contexts behind regulations that burden commercial, political,
and medical speakers. This Article argues for greater analytical flexibility, predicated
on premises behind constitutionally protected free speech. It argues for a rigorous
balancing test that, in compelled speech cases, takes into account the speech interest
at stake, the countervailing government interests, a means-ends analysis, alternatives
for communication, and whether the State seeks to enforce ideological orthodoxy.
Without taking account of countervailing and materially relevant factors—instead
resorting to wooden, judicially created categories—the Justices too often dismiss

1. This is consistent with the libertarian strand of thought to be found throughout
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, where all content-based regulations tend to be
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346
(2020) (“[C]ontent-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny.”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135
S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (“A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus
toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).
2. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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policy concerns on matters such as consumer privacy, healthcare information, and
labor negotiation.3 Rigorous balancing is needed to determine whether regulation is
narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government concern or to constitute an
intrusion against expressions about political, philosophical, historical, or artistic
topics. Proportional review assesses whether mandates to divulge facts have a close
“nexus between abstract law and concrete life.”4
Instead of an automatic resort to exacting or strict scrutiny for all manner of
compelled speech disclosures, greater breadth of legal and social concerns should
weigh into the Court’s review. Taking into account the context of statutory
requirements to disclose certain information, policy predicates for their enforcement,
and means chosen to achieve substantial aims would help courts to better distinguish
between pure speech factors and, what Justice Kagan called, “workaday economic
and regulatory policy.”5 That dichotomy involves a weighing of speech and
regulatory concerns. Concisely, legal context matters.
Part I discusses the compelled speech doctrine. Part II turns to a balanced
alternative, relying on multifactorial assessments rather than the Court’s monofocused analysis, which often seems to be result driven. It applies balancing to
instances of compelled speech, arguing for proportional review of statutes that
maintains autonomy, prevents state overreaching, and preserves regulatory functions
with incidental effects on speech.
I. ANTI-ORTHODOXY FUNCTION OF COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
In early compelled speech cases, the Court relied on anti-autocratic principles,
treating the Free Speech Clause as a safeguard of self-government and personal
expression against state-imposed orthodoxy. Those cases involved government
demands on certain persons to express state-created content. The opinions were antiautocratic in principle. The First Amendment was understood to prevent government
from imposing itself upon autonomous and civic communications.6 In more recent
times, the doctrine of compelled speech has become a means for courts to strike laws
regulating economic- and health-related matters.

3. Kathleen M. Sullivan elaborates on the definitions of rules, standards, categories, and
balancing in Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–62
(1992). For further distinctions between rules and standards, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and
Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 823, 828–32 (1991).
4. Wallace Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr.
Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479, 481–82 (1964).
5. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
6. Professor Alan Chen describes four traditional uses of the compelled speech doctrine:
(1) those that require ideological orthodoxy; (2) disclosure of private facts about associational
liberty; (3) those that require private actors to give speakers access to their properties; and (4)
requirements for professionals to disclose to the public information about services, operations,
and products. See Alan K. Chen, Compelled Speech and the Regulatory State, 97 IND. L.J. 881
(2022).
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The Supreme Court’s earliest compelled speech case, West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, relied on anti-authoritarian reasoning to explain why a
state-created speech requirement was unconstitutional.7 The principle informing the
holding was based in America’s history, dating to the ratification of the Bill of
Rights.8 In striking a law requiring school children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance
and to salute the flag, the Court recognized that government by consent protects an
individual’s right to disagree with the State.9 Particularly important to the principle
against compelled speech was the Court’s injunction in Barnette that, “[N]o official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”10 The right to refrain from expressing government’s patriotic message,
which preserves autonomy and prevents the State from imposing its views,
outweighed the government interest in enforced national unity.
Recognition of the First Amendment’s anti-totalitarian leaning was also manifest
in Wooley v. Maynard, which struck a state misdemeanor law against obfuscating the
state’s motto on license plates, “Live Free or Die.”11 As in Barnette, the decision
rested on the principle that government cannot force its political, cultural, or
otherwise ideological message on unwilling parties.12 The State in Wooley lacked
authority to require unwilling drivers, some of whom were pacifists, to display a
militaristic message on their private automobiles.13 At its core, the opinion stands
against government intrusion into individual autonomy and political personhood.
“[W]here the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable
to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for such message.”14 There is a balance here, where free
exercise of religion outweighs government hindrance to personal autonomy. The
Constitution guarantees freedom of thought against state actions, allowing persons
to articulate a view or to remain silent.15 The Court in Wooley recognized that
governing majorities cannot impose mainstream political ideas on disfavored
groups.16 All the Justices weighed conflicting interests, even those who were in
dissent and partial concurrence.17
In Barnette and Wooley, the Court rejected governments’ efforts to compel parties
to adopt viewpoints contrary to their political or religious leanings. The same
principles against authoritarian intrusion would be suppression of philosophical or
historical speech. These are protected against state intrusion by the First Amendment.
The State lacks authority to require autonomous actors to recite official views about
national loyalty and military readiness.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
See NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641–42.
Id. at 642.
430 U.S. 705, 706–07 (1977).
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 573 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 718 (White, J., joining and dissenting in part).
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Elsewhere, the Court found against a State’s effort to require the news media to
print content against its independent, journalistic choice. Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo was tied to guaranteed press freedoms; therefore, the case involved
competing First Amendment interests. The Court struck a statute that had required a
newspaper to provide political candidates space on its pages and opportunity to rebut
and reply to previous columns that criticized or attacked them. Such a law interfered
with the newspaper’s editorial discretion.18 A news outlet, the Court found, can
determine the format, timing, substance, and publishing needs concerning “public
issues,” including those dealing with “public officials.”19 Justice White, in
concurrence, even more clearly explained that “the balance struck by the First
Amendment with respect to the press” required society to “take the risk that
occasionally debate on vital matters will not be comprehensive and that all
viewpoints may not be expressed.”20 As with earlier cases, the Court was concerned
about enforcement of a law that dictated core content about political subjects.
Less convincing was the reasoning behind Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind of North Carolina, Inc. In that case, the majority relied on strict scrutiny to
hold unconstitutional a state’s charitable solicitation law, which had limited how
much fundraisers could budget toward overhead costs.21 This opinion balanced the
state interest in preventing donor fraud against fundraisers’ speech concerns. Key to
the majority’s holding was the finding that the State’s method of eliminating fraud
was not narrowly tailored.22 The opinion relied on the free speech values of personal
expression and of “free and robust debate.”23 The majority’s concern was with state
policies that threatened to chill charities’ discussions about personal or political
matters.
Riley does not, however, make clear that its holding is geared against autocratic
public policy, as was the case in Barnette and Wooley. Indeed, contrary to the Court’s
reasoning in Riley, self-government, and more narrowly the donors’ right to
transparency,24 might require public disclosures about how charitable contributions
are to be invested.

18. Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254–55, 258 (1974).
19. Id. at 258.
20. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
21. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
22. Id. at 789.
23. Id.
24. And, here, I am thinking of arguments about audiences’ First Amendment rights to
receive information. See Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-Ously? Free Speech Rights
and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2016); ROBERT C. POST,
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
FOR THE MODERN STATE 23 (2012) (“Within public discourse, by contrast, the First
Amendment ascribes autonomy equally to speakers and to their audience, so that the rule of
caveat emptor applies. . . . This contrast is quite stark, and it is the single most salient pattern
of entrenched First Amendment doctrine.”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 448–
450 (1996) (critiquing the audience-based approach); Ronald K.L. Collins, Pissing in the
Snow: A Cultural Approach to the First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REV. 783, 792 (1993)
(reviewing JAMES B. TWITCHELL, CARNIVAL CULTURE: THE TRASHING OF TASTE IN AMERICA
(1992) (“In today’s commercial America, television represents the democratization of
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The Riley majority was stalwart in disfavoring censorship but provided little
guidance for deciding why some forms of compelled messages—including warnings
on cigarette labels,25 disclosures of securities offerings,26 and labels on flammable
children’s garments27—raise no First Amendment concerns. Inadequate
methodological guidance has led to opportunistic First Amendment lawsuits.28 In the
most recent cases, as we will shortly see, the Court invoked the compelled speech
doctrine to strike regulations whose intent was to protect privacy, advance collective
bargaining, and disseminate healthcare information.29 The libertarian trend in
compelled speech doctrine has become a means for the Roberts Court to hold
unconstitutional laws with only an incidental effect on speech.30
II. CATEGORIES AS DEREGULATORY TOOLS
The Court’s recent deregulatory reliance on compelled speech doctrine is
ideologically consistent with other libertarian trends in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Formalistic uses of judicially created categories inadequately weigh
broader legal contexts of economic regulations requiring unwilling parties to display
or communicate messages. This Part reviews how a wooden use of the compelled
speech doctrine has failed to adequately weigh other relevant and important
government policies, including medical privacy, consumer protection, and labor
relations.

discourse; it is the majoritarian medium that not only echoes, but in a real sense is a voice of
the masses.”) (emphasis in original)).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–40; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring); see Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children from Joe
Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of
Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479, 563 (1997).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa; 15 U.S.C.A. § 77g; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976).
27. 16 C.F.R. § 1615.5; 16 C.F.R. § 1615.31(b).
28. See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1624–25 (2015) (discussing opportunistic uses of free speech
lawsuits to challenge antitrust, criminal solicitation, criminal conspiracy, and other laws).
29. Professor Massaro provides an invaluable list of contrasting factors for analyzing the
continuum of government and speech interests. Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 UNIV. PA.
J. CONST. L. 365, 415–17 (2014).
30. When viewed in context, lack of balance belies the Court’s stated commitment to
avoiding First Amendment findings preventing incidental burdens on speech. Compare Barr
v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (contrasting incidental
regulations of speech and content-based restrictions), and id. at 2347 (“’the First Amendment
does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental
burdens on speech’”) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011)), with id.
at 2360 (describing restraints on speech that do not raise compelling government interests,
including, “drug labels, securities forms, and tax statements”) (Breyer, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
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A. Anti-Regulatory Trends in Compelled Speech Doctrine
The anti-authoritarian norm of compelled speech doctrine that emerged from
Barnette, which prevented government from imposing its political orthodoxy, has
morphed into something quite different, a doctrine that business litigants rely on to
make deregulatory arguments. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission struck down a requirement that a utility company’s mailings include
“political editorials, feature stories on matters of public interest, tips on energy
conservation, and straightforward information about utility services and bills.”31
Nowhere did the Court weigh the countervailing public concern for flora and fauna
conservation, environmental information, and public utility regulation. The adoption
of the highest standard of review dismissed California’s and other states’ explanation
for why a substantial need existed in communicating with utility ratepayers. Billing
envelopes were used to “inform customers of proposed rate hikes and public hearings
without challenge. Public utilities have also been required to enclose important
information concerning conservation programs, federal tax law, and other public
service-oriented information.”32 Such notices directed at consumers were consistent
with the marketplace of ideas principle that additional information tends to advance,
not contract, free speech rights.
Instead of deferring to the exercise of police power to regulate a state-made energy
monopoly, the Court protected the company’s right to profit from greater energy
consumption. With the majority characterizing the case in the speech bucket, the
Public Utilities Commission’s order failed to meet the almost insurmountable strict
scrutiny standard. The interest of the audience in receiving environmental and
consumer-oriented news from the regulatory actor plays no role in the majority’s
decision. Rather than identifying whether the State’s interest in public welfare was
substantial enough to warrant allowing for the inclusion of factual consumer
information, the Court required a finding of compelling government interest and
narrowly tailored means.33 The majority treated the public utility’s mailings not as
commercial messages but as core free speech.
The deregulatory free speech doctrine recognizes but a few historic categories of
unprotected communications that need not meet the highest burden of proof.34 I
review it first and then explain where and how it has been determinative in compelled
speech jurisprudence. The categorical rule to First Amendment jurisprudence
appears in cases like United States v. Alvarez, where the plurality rejected a balancing
approach, proffering only a few low value “historic and traditional categories” of
speech subject to regulation, including in this list defamation and true threats.35 The

31. 475 U.S. 1, 1 (1986).
32. Amicus Brief in Support of Appellees at 19–20, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (No. 84-1044).
33. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 19 (“Notwithstanding that it burdens protected
speech, the Commission's order could be valid if it were a narrowly tailored means of serving
a compelling state interest.”).
34. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (announcing that there is no
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First
Amendment”).
35. 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (“In light of the substantial and expansive threats to free
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author of the concurrence to Alvarez, on the other hand, would have wanted greater
thoroughness rather than the plurality’s “strict categorical analysis.”36 Those
categories, as Justice Breyer put it in a concurrence to another case, can be “outcomedeterminative.”37 His approach represents a more discerning form of reasoning that
is focused on public policies rather than judicially created categories.38
Reed v. Town of Gilbert adopted a categorical rationale rather than engaging in
thorough vetting of legal concerns giving rise to a regulation affecting individual’s
messages. Justice Thomas for the majority wrote that strict scrutiny applies to all
content-based regulations.39 The decision’s absolute-sounding statement is
misleadingly opaque. The same categorical statement of content regulations being
subject to strict scrutiny appears in the more recently decided Barr v. American
Association of Political Consultants.40 This Article argues that simple categories
should be rules of thumb that must be understood contextually, weighing speech
against day-to-day regulation of economic, health, safety, and labor policies. Laws
with an incidental effect on speech are distinct from state-imposed, orthodox
messages about political, personal, scientific, or philosophical matters.41 Judgments
should be “fully reasoned, public explanations that are subject to public and
professional scrutiny.”42 Categorical rules do not accomplish that level of interpretive
articulation. The Reed majority’s expansion of the strict scrutiny doctrine to all
content-based regulations43 overlooks many content-based restrictions that raise no

expression posed by content-based restrictions, this Court has rejected as ‘startling and
dangerous’ a ‘free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Stevens, 559
U.S. at 470).
36. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).
37. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2306 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I would place less emphasis on trying to decide
whether the statute at issue should be categorized as an example of ‘viewpoint discrimination,’
‘content discrimination,’ ‘commercial speech,’ ‘government speech,’ or the like.”).
39. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 156 (2015) (“A law that is content based on
its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, contentneutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”);
see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 457 (2015) (relying on strict scrutiny
analysis to uphold a content-based limitation on judicial candidate speech).
40. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (“Contentbased laws are subject to strict scrutiny.”).
41. I am adopting this list from a formulation of five Justices on the United States
Supreme Court. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731–32 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring, joined by Justice Kagan) (“Laws restricting false statements about philosophy,
religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and the like raise such concerns, and in many
contexts have called for strict scrutiny.”); id. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Justice
Scalia & Thomas) (“[T]here are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize
purportedly false speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing
truthful speech. Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social
sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern would present such a threat.”).
42. Barry Sullivan, Law and Discretion in Supreme Court Recusals: A Response to
Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 909 (2013).
43. Reed, 576 U.S. at 170–72.
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First Amendment concerns. In a concurrence, Justice Breyer conceded that “content
discrimination, as a conceptual tool, can sometimes reveal weaknesses in the
government’s rationale for a rule that limits speech.” Breyer went on to explain that
a strong presumption that strict scrutiny applies to all content-based restrictions goes
too far.44 Another concurrence, written by Justice Kagan, listed the many types of
permissible signage laws that are content-based but are not subject to strict scrutiny
analysis, including those marking historical sites, favoring blind crossings and
hidden alley signs, and beautifying highways by limiting areas of postings.45
Reed’s blanket statement about review of regulations that impact speakers’
expressive contents became, in short order, a weapon for deregulatory,46 antiabortion,47 and libertarian efforts.48 Opportunistic reliance on the First Amendment
has also become a litigation strategy in challenges to a variety of economic laws,
such as the Security and Exchange Commission’s financial disclosure requirements;
gambling laws; therapeutic counseling; franchise agreements; hygienic, professional
rules; and labor disclosures, including details on filing grievances, negotiating, and
arbitrating disputes.49
In the area of commercial speech regulations, the Court has recently sided with
advertisers whose data retention practices were challenged for divulging private
patient and subscribing physician information. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the
Court held that the First Amendment protects pharmaceutical manufacturers’
acquisition and curation of private records of prescriptions, acquired from unwilling
physicians and non-consenting patients.50 Rather than give due weight to state
concern about the harms to consumers’ privacy from the marketing of such
information, the Court characterized the issue as being about sharing commercial
information, which elevated the review to heightened scrutiny. As in the Lochner
era, the court used freedom of contract—as between pharmacies that mine data and

44. Id. at 176 (Breyer, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 180 (Kagan, J., concurring).
46. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty, & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “weaponizing the First Amendment”); NIFLA v.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382 (stating that medical professionals opposed to regulations
“generally speaking” do not “have a right to use the Constitution as a weapon”); Morgan N.
Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian
Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1393 (2017) (demonstrating that “corporations use
the First Amendment as a deregulatory weapon, urging courts to strike down structural and
economic regulations as violations of their speech rights”).
47. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against
Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 119 (2019) (arguing that in recent
years “the Court’s all male, conservative guard” have pursued an “anti-reproductive rights
agenda”).
48. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (expressing alarm that “the
majority has chosen the winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it
against workaday economic and regulatory policy”).
49. See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1614–15 (2015) (listing examples of how plaintiffs rely on the
First Amendment in litigation challenges to social regulation); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (requiring
that employers negotiate in “good faith”); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
50. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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corporate pharmaceutical purchasers of the information—to strike consumer
regulation. As Shoshana Zuboff might say, by “flying the banner of ‘private
property’ and ‘freedom of contract,’ much as surveillance capitalists march under the
flag of freedom of speech,” the Court risks the “conflation of industry regulation with
‘tyranny’ and ‘authoritarianism.’”51 In order to adopt that analysis, the Court played
down concerns voiced by medical societies and professionals who argued that data
mining companies would use the prescription records to pressure physicians into
prescribing more expensive medicines than those that were clinically indicated or
simply more affordable.52 Patients whose information was subjected to resale lacked
any transparency about how their information would be used by third parties not
involved in their medical care. The statute was meant to disincentivize commercial
vendors from profiting on the resale of medical histories to pharmaceutical
manufacturers. The IMS Health, Inc. majority labeled marketing strategy “speech”
that warranted heightened scrutiny.
The majority’s singular focus on first-order free speech concerns gives inadequate
weight to second-order private and social concerns. Relying on a categorical
presumption that accurate marketing information is good for consumers, the Court
struck a law against acquiring data without the data subjects’ consent.53 Neither did
the Court in IMS Health, Inc. give adequate constitutional weight to at least a limited
notion of the constitutional right of privacy.54
Another case to review and strike commercial regulation with an incidental effect
on speech, Expressions Hair Designs v. Schneiderman, penned by Chief Justice
Roberts and joined by a mixed liberal and conservative majority, further
demonstrates the dominant libertarian strain in American free speech doctrine.
Merchants claimed their speech was affected by New York’s prohibition against
imposing a surcharge on credit card sales.55 They asserted that the law required them
to label prices contrary to their commercial interests and, hence, intruded against
their free speech. The case could have been decided on the basis of precedent that
found there were “material differences between disclosure requirements and outright
prohibitions on speech.”56 The statute required the posting of truthful information
relevant to consumers.

51. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 106–07 (2019).
52. The Court discounted out of hand the state’s extensive legislative record that
demonstrated that “[i]f prescriber-identifying information were available . . . then detailing
would be effective in promoting brand-name drugs that are more expensive and less safe than
generic alternatives.” IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. at 576; see also id. at 597 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Vermont compiled a substantial legislative record to corroborate this line of
reasoning.”).
53. The marketplace of ideas doctrine stems from one of the most seminal of all the free
speech cases, Abrams v. United States. See 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
For a critique of this doctrine see Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1, 8–11 (2016).
54. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding privacy is protected
in the context of contraceptives used by married couples).
55. 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017); see N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2021).
56. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985).
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The law was not ideologically driven, nor did it require merchants to adopt statesponsored views on commerce or sales. The majority nevertheless found the state’s
credit card swipe fee law censored protected expression, rather than simply governed
commercial transactions subject to intermediate scrutiny. The Court’s bright line test
of content neutrality should have deferred to legislative authority over economic
conduct.57 The opinion, furthermore, failed to articulate the appropriate level of
scrutiny to use on remand.
The novel conclusion that the regulation on credit card surcharges was subject to
First Amendment review because it required merchants to alter how they
communicate prices seems to render suspect virtually all laws on how pricing signs
are displayed. The opinion is unhinged from anti-authoritarian norms in Barnette.
The New York statute required no adoption of political, nationalistic, religious, or
otherwise ideological views.58
The holding and reasoning in Expressions Hair Design threaten to upend a variety
of laws compelling private party speech for various economic, social, and police
power reasons. No heightened scrutiny applies to regulations that require merchants
to label toilets;59 refrigerators, air conditioners, water heaters, and other electronic
consumer goods;60 “Rx only” prescription drugs;61 alcoholic beverages likely to
cause birth defects tied to pregnant women’s drinking;62 hazardous substances to be
kept out of reach of children;63 markings on commercial vehicles;64
pharmaceuticals;65 tobacco cartons;66 bank titles;67 and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation notifications.68
The difference between core free speech and commercial regulation is better
identified through a balance of speech, countervailing concerns, means-ends
analysis, First Amendment principles against government orthodoxy, and alternative
opportunities for communication. Reasoned decision-making should thus be

57. See IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. at 567 (holding that “restrictions on protected
expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on
nonexpressive conduct”).
58. GEN. BUS. § 518. The Supreme Court held section 518 to be a speech regulation. It
had provided that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who
elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.” Expressions
Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017).
59. See, e.g., § 37:98. Gender Neutral Bathrooms, Comprehensive, 1C MATTHEWS
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 37:98 (3d ed.); Equitable Restrooms Act, Pub. L. No. 101-0165,
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/25 (2020).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6292, 6294.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(4)(A).
62. 27 U.S.C. § 215(a).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(J)(i).
64. 49 C.F.R. § 390.21 (2020).
65. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2020).
66. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 709.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(a)(1)(B) (“Each sign required under subparagraph (A) shall include
a statement that insured deposits are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States
Government.”).
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systematic, not categorically deaf to the nuanced legal values, policy priorities, and
prudential constraints of regulations with incidental effects on expressive conduct.
B. Conflicting Constitutional Concerns
The Court’s libertarian leanings in its free speech analyses gloss over nuanced
rationales behind the enforcement of economic and regulatory compelled speech.
The Court’s reliance on an autonomy-based doctrine on protected speech glosses
over conflicts of constitutional proportion. Dean Erwin Griswold argues that
balancing is a “comprehensive” or “integral approach” that “accepts the task of the
judge as one which involves the effect of all the provisions of the Constitution, not
merely in a narrow literal sense, but in a living, organic sense, including the elaborate
and complex governmental structure which the Constitution . . . has erected.”69
Lack of balance leads to one-sided opinions that give inadequate weight to
countervailing legal interests. The discordant issue of abortion, for example, has met
a free speech doctrine now extending to healthcare regulations. That sub-doctrine of
compelled speech glosses over constitutional concerns about constitutional privacy.
That dignity interest has, since Roe v. Wade, been understood to be the basis for a
woman’s right to discontinue a pregnancy, especially prior to fetal viability.70 Later
cases, like Planned Parenthood v. Casey71 and Gonzales v. Carhart,72 have chipped
away at that right, but, for now at least—with Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt73
and June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo74 it remains intact. The Court has also
instrumentalized the compelled speech doctrine against a state effort to inform
pregnant women of prenatal options.
Despite the obvious substantive due process concern for health, a majority in
National Institute for Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA) only tangentially
mentioned the constitutional privacy of deciding whether to abort. Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority, relied on the First Amendment to strike a law meant to
prevent unlicensed pregnancy crisis centers from misleading pregnant clients who
sought prenatal advice.75 The Court also struck the provision requiring unlicensed
crisis center employees to inform clients that they lacked a medical license.76 Here

69. Erwin N. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark—A Discussion of the Approach of the
Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167, 173 (1963).
70. See 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
71. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
72. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
73. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
74. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
75. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123471–123472. The
Circuit Court had found that California passed the statute to provide information to pregnant
women that they were “using the medical services of a facility that ha[d] not satisfied licensing
standards set by the state” and that they “often present[ed] misleading information to women
about reproductive medical services.” Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Harris, 839 F.3d
823, 843 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (2018).
76. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2377–78. Prof. Caroline Mala Corbin writes of how compelled
licensing disclosures “further the decisional autonomy of their audience by preventing
potential deception.” Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277,
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again, the majority drew on the categorical rule against content regulation found in
Town of Gilbert,77 but after laying out the argument, the NIFLA majority nevertheless
did not explicitly adopt strict scrutiny to review posting requirements at unlicensed
pregnancy centers,78 leaving that issue for later resolution but strongly hinting that it
favored that level of review.79 Justice Thomas perfunctorily held that intermediate
scrutiny sufficed to strike the regulation.80 The Court held unconstitutional the State
of California’s Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and
Transparency Act (“FACT Act”), a legislative requirement to provide pregnant
women truthful information about where to seek state services for prenatal care. The
requirement to post health information counteracted unlicensed crisis centers’
endeavors to dissuade and coerce women from seeking to exercise their private right
to obtain an abortion.81 Many women who sought unlicensed clinics’ services were
unaware of their reproductive choices and susceptible to misinformation.82
The majority, however, rejected use of the “lower level of scrutiny,” which the
Court had earlier relied on in professional speech cases, such as Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel. The latter case controls when courts review regulations that
require “purely factual and uncontroversial information.”83 Under this lower
standard, the First Amendment prevents chilling speech against “unjustified or
unduly burdensome disclosure requirements,” but “an advertiser’s rights are
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the

1349 (2014).
77. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
78. Id. at 2375.
79. See Clay Calvert, Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened Scrutiny? How the Supreme
Court’s 2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus Exacerbate Problems with Compelled-Speech
Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1409 (2019) (discussing NIFLA’s standard of
review).
80. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375–77.
81. NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., UNMASKING FAKE CLINICS: AN INVESTIGATION
INTO CALIFORNIA’S CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2015), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NARAL-Pro-Choice-CA-Unmasking-Fake-Clinics-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XDZ-AWR8] (stating that years of investigations demonstrated that crisis
pregnancy centers “only have one agenda: stop any woman from accessing abortion care,
regardless of her situation”).
82. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 47, at 71.
83. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985); NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375; Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About
Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447, 505 (2018) (“Many courts and commentators have treated the
Zauderer ‘reasonable relationship’ test as a highly deferential test similar to rational basis
review.”); Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57
ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 681 (2015) (asserting that the test in Zauderer is “akin to rational basis
review”); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 883 (2015)
(“Because commercial speakers retain ‘minimal’ First Amendment interests, Zauderer does
not employ the specific vocabulary of ‘rational basis’ review, which would have suggested
extreme judicial deference. It instead adopts terminology that unequivocally locates judicial
review further toward the deferential end of the spectrum than the intermediate scrutiny
authorized by Central Hudson.”).
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State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”84 The Court in Zauderer
determined that under the First Amendment the State could prohibit deception, but
not advice about specific legal views.85 The Court emphasized consumers’ interest
in receiving accurate information.86 But Zauderer also extends to mandatory
advertising disclosure requirements, such as the obligation for debt relief agencies to
identify themselves, to “correct perceived abuses.”87
Contrary to the majority’s characterization in NIFLA, the factual disclosure
requirements provided women with factual information and prevented crisis centers
from giving them misleading advice. That legislative policy was consistent with the
marketplace of ideas doctrine’s stress on the right to disseminate and learn
information. Requiring their posting was not authoritarian but communicative, and
therefore consistent with free speech principles.
Those factual disclosures were critical to the social context of the FACT
legislation. Crisis pregnancy centers purposefully sought to mislead women into
believing they were entering a medical facility by obfuscating names, dressing staff
in medical garb, mimicking the administrative operations of medical offices, and
advertising in portions of telephone directories under “abortion services” and “health
services.”88
The reasoning in NIFLA was inconsistent with the Court’s earlier holding in
Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey,89 which upheld a statute
requiring “truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the abortion
procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable
gestational age’ of the fetus.”90 In Casey, Justice O’Connor’s joint opinion
recognized that the State’s mandate implicated physicians’ First Amendment right
not to speak. A majority of Justices nevertheless upheld the requirement to provide
truthful healthcare information.91 The Pennsylvania provision required not only
informed consent but also mandated physicians to disclose a list of adoption
agencies.92
In his dissent to NIFLA, Justice Breyer found unconvincing any meaningful
distinction between a law “requir[ing] a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion
about adoption services” and a statute mandating “a medical counselor to tell a

84. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
85. Id. at 638, 644, 649, 655–56.
86. Id. at 651 (“[W]arning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order
to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).
87. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231–34 (2010)
(upholding disclosure requirement for “debt relief agencies” imposed by the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005).
88. Corbin, supra note 76, at 1340–41.
89. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); The Supreme Court — Leading Cases, 132 HARV. L. REV. 277,
351 (2018) (“The Court fundamentally undermined its previous commercial speech doctrine,
which allowed compelled disclosures in order to protect consumer interests, and advanced one
side in the abortion debate by carving out a convoluted exception to its previous medicaldisclosure cases.”).
90. 505 U.S. at 882.
91. See id. at 884.
92. Id. at 881.
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woman seeking prenatal care or other reproductive healthcare about childbirth and
abortion services.”93 The majority did not satisfactorily answer Breyer’s rhetorical
question about the incongruity of the Court’s holdings in those two cases.94
As often occurs in First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court invoked a
convenient rule of decision to explain away an inconsistency. The contrast was stark
in its divergent treatment of a law designed to sow doubt among women in California
seeking to exercise their choice of privacy and obtain prenatal services.95 Professor
Frederick Schauer explains that these types of doctrinal inconsistencies and
indeterminacies are based on realist considerations, rather than any semblance of
purely legal analysis.96 Categories of decision can compromise judicial subtlety,
modesty, and objectivity.97 They often appear result-oriented.
Little subtlety was on display in the ruling to NIFLA. California aimed to inform
women who were visiting a pregnancy crisis center that no medical staff was on
premises. At pregnancy centers with licensed medical staff, the state’s mandated
message informed indigent women of available counseling about obstetric services,
including “family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of
contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.”98 The FACT Act
appeared narrowly tailored and proportional to ensure “that pregnant women in
California know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals.”99
The Act was clear that it was advancing women’s knowledge of “their rights and the
health care services available to them.”100 Neither licensed nor unlicensed facilities
were required to counsel women on the State’s message and they continued to enjoy
ample alternative channels for communications. Nothing was stopping them from
voicing their opposition to pregnant clients about the public notices or more generally
to oppose abortion explicitly as a matter of principle.
Justice Thomas in NIFLA was selective in targeting laws designed to inform
pregnant women of prenatal choices, including abortion. The majority ignored the
many, legitimate, and uncontroversial local, state, and federal disclosure
requirements with incidental effects on communications.101 His distinction was

93. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2385 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2361.
95. Frederick Schauer, Not Just About License Plates: Walker v. Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Government Speech, and Doctrinal Overlap in the First Amendment, 2015 SUP. CT.
REV. 265, 266 (2015) (demonstrating that “doctrinal multiplicity pervades the law . . . but it
appears especially salient with respect to the First Amendment”).
96. Id. at 298.
97. In Iancu v. Brucetti, the Court relied on the content/act dichotomy to strike a provision
of the Lanham Act. By categorizing the challenged provision as speech, the Court elevated its
jurisdiction to render a libertarian opinion. The “immoral” and “scandalous” provisions of the
law, the majority held, constitute unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 139 S. Ct. 2294,
2299 (2019). Even though trademarks are entitlements that do not limit speech but only
provide benefits to recipients, the Court treated them as free speech to strike that portion of
law.
98. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369.
99. Id. at 2368–70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 2369 (quoting 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 700, § 2 (A.B. 775)).
101. In his dissent, Breyer pointed out that virtually any disclosure law would be
unconstitutional under the majority’s reasoning. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer. J.,
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content-based rather than objective. The Court’s selection of the compelled speech
category was fatal to the regulation. It might have done a more thorough job through
contextual analysis of a law requiring a professional service to post public health
information. The majority instead treated the requirement to publish information
about the availability of free prenatal services as viewpoint discrimination. This went
against the doctrinal grain of Zauderer since requirements to provide truthful
professional information are ordinarily not subject to First Amendment heightened
review.102
For all its formalistic tangle, the Court failed to balance the competing interests
of the clinic’s speech, the government’s professional standards, and the privacy of
women who accidently entered a crisis center rather than a medical facility. The
Court’s opinion in NIFLA articulates why the informational signs about prenatal care
were unconstitutional, compelled speech.103 Yet, the crisis centers were not required
to adopt the State’s message, nor were they prevented from counseling clients to put
newborns up for adoption rather than to seek an abortion. Rather than weighing
competing constitutional interests, the Court relied on a categorical version of
compelled speech doctrine as a deregulatory rule of decision.104
C. Free Riders’ Speech
In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, the
Court did not bother with the niceties of stare decisis, and instead relied on exacting
scrutiny to overturn analogous, recent precedent.105 The Justices reviewed an Illinois
law that compelled non-unionized public employees to pay union agency fees for
collective bargaining.106 The Janus majority overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, which, to the diametric contrary, had found no First Amendment violation

dissenting). For a short list of disclosure regulations, see supra text accompanying notes 97–
98.
102. Zauderer v. Off. Of Disciplinary Couns. of Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. at 626, 651
(1985).
103. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
104. Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the First
Amendment of the United States), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding
the privacy right to marital contraception), with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(defining unmarried people’s contraception right of privacy), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (protecting women’s compelling privacy right to abortion services).
105. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018). For this premise Justice Alito relied on precedent
dealing with commercial subsidization of speech. Id. (citing Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012)) (“Under ‘exacting’ scrutiny, we noted, a compelled subsidy must
‘serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms.’”). The majority went through a modified analysis of
stare decisis based on factors Justice O’Connor announced in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (asserting that the Court determines whether to overturn
precedent based on “a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations,” including
workability, extent of reliance, legal developments, and altered circumstances). Ultimately,
Justice Alito wrote that the Abood decision was poorly reasoned and unworkable. Janus, 138
S. Ct. at 2460–79.
106. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e) (2021).
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in a provision to a bargaining agreement that required non-unionized workers to pay
dues for collective bargaining but did not subject them to fees for unrelated
“ideological activities.”107 The Court found that even non-members whose views
were incompatible with the union’s political lobbying nevertheless shared much of
the same interests in obtaining fair wages, conditions, and benefits as members of
the public employee union.108 Therefore, an exclusive bargaining representative was
suitable for advancing their mutual interests.109
In overruling the forty-year-old Abood precedent, the Court found that bargaining
for employee benefits was permeated with public-sector unions’ expressive
activities.110 The Janus majority found the distinction between them, made by the
earlier case, to be unworkable. This was consistent with the old adage that “the notion
that economic and political concerns are separable is pre-Victorian.”111 The Court in
Janus, therefore, applied “exacting scrutiny” standard to its review of compelled
agency fees, which the Court explained was not as demanding as the strict standard
of scrutiny.112 The Court’s reasoning was that, while a complete dichotomy between
economics and politics was not possible, unions lobbying for political reform or in
support of candidates was not the same as bargaining on behalf of workers.
The first prong of Janus’s exacting scrutiny test required the government to show
compelling state interest. The Court presumed Illinois satisfied it by aiming to
achieve conditions conducive to “labor peace.”113 Yet the Court in Janus did not
adopt the typical “least restrictive means” applicable to strict scrutiny; rather, it held
Illinois had the burden of proving that compelling interest could not be “achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”114 As an
example of a regulation less restrictive of associational freedoms, the Court referred
to the federal statutory scheme for U.S. Postal Service employees, which relied on a
unified voice on wages, hours, and other conditions of employment without requiring
the assessment of agency fees from unwilling workers.115
In her dissent to Janus, Justice Kagan reframed the issue. Rather than relying on
exacting scrutiny, Justice Kagan pointed out that public employers have “substantial
latitude to regulate their employees’ speech—especially about terms of employment”
needed to effectively operate in the workplace.116 Just as a private firm, Justice Kagan

107. 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977).
108. See id. at 229–30 (“Public employees are not basically different from private
employees; on the whole, they have the same sort of skills, the same needs, and seek the same
advantages.”).
109. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1625 (2018) (“The NLRA provides
rules for the recognition of exclusive bargaining representatives.”).
110. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (asserting that collective bargaining has “powerful
political and civic consequences”) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps., 567 U.S. 298, 310–11
(2012)).
111. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 814 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
112. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. The Court found that exacting scrutiny lies between strict
scrutiny for pure speech and intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2466; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7111, 7114.
116. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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wrote, when it acts as an employer, the government “has a wide berth” to regulation
expression concerning “the terms and conditions of employment.”117 In its collective
bargaining, the union was acting in its traditional role “as exclusive bargaining
representative” that carried “the duty fairly and equitably to represent all employees
of the craft or class, union and nonunion.”118 Agency fees had to be reviewed within
the context of labor negotiations needed to exercise “workaday economic and
regulatory policy,”119 not through a less refined categorical approach, which placed
collective bargaining at nearly the same level as core First Amendment expressions
about politics, philosophy, social sciences, the arts, and history.120
Justice Kagan would have used intermediate scrutiny, applicable to other cases
dealing with public employees.121 That balancing approach, she argued, was
applicable to collective bargaining because both public-sector union cases and those
concerning public employees dealt with speech regulated by government
employers.122
The First Amendment safeguards individual and public expressions, uninhibited
by government orthodoxies. That principle emerged with the early cases reviewed in
Part I of this Article. As in other areas of constitutional law, government is prohibited
“from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.”123 Courts
regard compelled speech regulations to be suspect because of their potential to distort
speakers’ opinions. The Court in Janus found that a collective bargaining mandate
forces an unwilling party to adopt arguments of a state-sponsored union; in so doing,
the majority adopted a categorical view of free speech that virtually ignored the
countervailing government and worker interests to bringing a unified voice to the
bargaining table. The Court put its thumb on the speech of free riders, to the detriment
of unified labor negotiation.
The Janus majority found the Court’s earlier distinction in Abood between
collective bargaining and “ideological activities” to be unworkable.124 As in other
areas of free speech doctrine, the Supreme Court is guided by a libertarian strain of
free speech that finds no difference between the First Amendment treatment of
economic speech from quintessential forms of creative communications about

117. Id. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
118. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761 (1961).
119. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501–02 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
120. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731–32 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the
arts, and the like raise such concerns, and in many contexts have called for strict scrutiny.”).
For an extensive discussion about core protected speech, see Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech
Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1027–42 (2015).
121. The public employees’ speech has evolved through Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410 (2006); and Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014).
122. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Abood and Pickering raised
variants of the same basic issue: the extent of the government's authority to make employment
decisions affecting expression. And in both, the Court struck the same basic balance, enabling
the government to curb speech when—but only when—the regulation was designed to protect
its managerial interests.”).
123. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
124. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977).
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ideologies, politics, theories, and tastes.125 The majority’s “exacting scrutiny”
standard126 rendered the regulation of agency dues subject to a rigid test that would
have been more appropriate to the review of government employer’s suppression of
views, thoughts, and association prerogatives.
D. Compelled Messages and Government Spending
Constitutional issues arise when a federal subsidy is conditioned on a private
party’s adoption, integration, or fusion of an ideological government message, not a
regulation on economic conduct or on the conditions of employment. When the First
Amendment becomes a judicial trump to regulation no matter how important the
legislative intent, the analysis can overlook the complexity of the various legal
priorities. This Section seeks to further demonstrate that true conflicts of
constitutional priorities require proportional judicial assessments, even when free
speech concerns are at stake. A case study helps to illustrate the point.
In the 2013 case, Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International, Inc. I (AOSI I), the Court invalidated a policy requiring
recipients of federal public funding to adopt a message expressing a governmental
viewpoint.127 AOSI I found unconstitutional a federal law—United States Leadership
Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (“Leadership Act”)—mandating
recipients and affiliates to explicitly oppose prostitution and sex trafficking.128
Plaintiffs were domestic recipients of grants who believed the law would undermine
their outreach to provide prostitutes with legal private services.
The Court found unconstitutional the provision requiring recipients to renounce
prostitution,129 but the majority ignored the relevance of Congress’s Spending Clause
power to at least require recipients to renounce human trafficking. The latter portion
of the statute was tied to federal policy against sexual slavery and child abduction.
The policy against human trafficking was not only connected to public
spending130 and other federal statutes131 but also to the Thirteenth Amendment,132 a

125. See Alexander Tsesis, Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy, and the Digital Audience, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1585, 1597 (2019) (discussing the distinction between commercial
speech and ideas, facts, philosophies, or tastes).
126. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. The Court found that exacting scrutiny lies between
strict scrutiny for pure speech and intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech. See id. See
also Clay Calvert, Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case After Becerra and
Janus? Sorting Out Standards of Scrutiny and Untangling “Speech as Speech” Cases from
Disputes Incidentally Affecting Expression, MICH. ST. L. REV. 73, 127 (2019).
127. 570 U.S. 205 (2013). Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (finding unconstitutional a flag solute requirement); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
717 (1977) (holding it unconstitutional to require people to carry a government message on
personal property).
128. 570 U.S. 205, 208 (2013); see also 22 U.S.C. § 7601.
129. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 217–19.
130. See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1.
131. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (adopting international treaty against child abduction); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595 (criminalizing sex trafficking).
132. Kathleen Kim, The Thirteenth Amendment and Human Trafficking: Lessons &
Limitations, 36 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1005, 1011–12 (2020) (discussing how the “[Trafficking
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matter entirely overlooked in AOSI I. Balancing the interests of speech and the
countervailing government interest in combating modern day slavery should have
come into play. Professor Akhil Amar points out that the Thirteenth Amendment
shifted the constitutional paradigm, including the significance of the First
Amendment.133 The Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against slavery and
involuntary servitude134 made no appearance in the Court’s opinion to AOSI I.135
Taking the matter purely from a free speech perspective, the Agency for
International Development lacked constitutional basis for requiring Alliance for
Open Society International to ideologically renounce prostitution. Balancing,
however, should also have grappled with congressional authority found in Section 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment over human trafficking.
On the one hand, the Court’s reasoning in AOSI I is grounded in jurisprudence
that prohibits government to burden speech and impose ideological orthodoxy. That
principle of free speech, which stems from the reasoning in Barnette, must figure in
any balancing. Individuals and associations enjoy freedom in “politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion.”136 But that right is not vacuous; rather, it should
be understood within the intersectional context of the Constitution. The Court in
AOSI I overlooked the equally pressing constitutional mandate against slavery and
human trafficking. Had the Court carefully weighed the Leadership Act’s antitrafficking purposes it might have connected its anti-trafficking provision to the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude.137
The single-minded focus on speech appears also in the 2020 follow-up, Agency
for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. II
(AOSI II). The later case also adhered to formalism rather than contextual

Victims Protection Act’s] definition follows previous Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation intended to prevent perpetrators from extracting labor or services from others
through unlawful means”).
133. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 155–60 (1992).
134. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 443–44 (1968) (holding that Section 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to rationally enforce laws against the
incidents of slavery or involuntary servitude); see also Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.
Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (holding that the but-for test applies to statutory
interpretation of a law passed by congressional Thirteenth Amendment powers). 42 U.S.C. §
1981.
135. AOSI I, 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
136. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
137. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112; see also Alexander
Tsesis, Gender Discrimination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,
1690 (2012) (discussing Congress’s authority to pass the Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000); Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley’s Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1697, 1712 (2012) (mentioning reliance on Thirteenth Amendment to prevent
“exploitation of women in the sex trafficking industry”); William M. Carter, Jr., The
Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 71
MD. L. REV. 21, 26 (2011) (“The most successful aspect of modern Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence has been its extension to contemporary instances of coercion, such as human
trafficking, involuntary confinement, and forced labor.”); Kim, supra note 132, at 1006.
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balancing.138 As before, at play were federal policies against human trafficking and
viewpoint discrimination. This time around, the Court held that under the U.S.
Constitution, foreign organizations and citizens do not enjoy the same degree of free
speech protections. As to non-U.S. entities receiving federal grants, the First
Amendment does not prevent the federal government from compelling the adoption
of an explicit statement against prostitution and anti-trafficking.139 Rather than
engage in the constitutional balance that would examine free speech and antitrafficking norms as they pertain to foreign nationals and organizations,140 the Court
simply concluded that “it is long settled as a matter of American constitutional law
that foreign citizens outside U.S. territory do not possess rights under the U.S.
Constitution.”141 Certainly, the Thirteenth Amendment is inapplicable in the later
case because by its very terms it applies only “within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.”142 This dichotomy on AOIS I and AOIS II helps to
illustrate how context matters.
III. CONTEXT, BALANCE, DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s failure to contextualize and balance speech against
countervailing values raised in IMS Health, Inc., Janus, and NIFLA places hurdles,
impeding privacy, labor, and health regulations. Such holdings have more to do with
the Court’s libertarian leanings than core speech protected under the First
Amendment, which include ideas of politics, philosophy, history, and aesthetics.143
These cases overturn regulatory policy by categorical references to a concept of
speech that goes well beyond the anti-autocracy principle found within Barnette and
Wooley. That anti-authoritarian framework differentiates between core speech and
“workaday economic and regulatory polic[ies].”144 The judicial check against

138. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2099–
2100 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority relied on categorical reasoning
in claiming foreign citizens can be barred from constitutional protections of speech).
139. See id. at 2085.
140. One unanswered question, relevant in the context of a foreign entity receiving U.S.
funding, is the extent to which the jurisdictional clause of the Thirteenth Amendment limits
congressional power. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
141. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2086 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, foreign corporations,
the Court stated, have long been regarded to be separate from their U.S. affiliates, “[I]t is long
settled as a matter of American corporate law that separately incorporated organizations are
separate legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations.” Id. at 2087. Justice Breyer in
dissent questioned both these premises of the majority.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
143. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731–32 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the
arts, and the like raise such concerns, and in many contexts have called for strict scrutiny.”);
see id. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Laws restricting false statements about philosophy,
religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern would
present such a threat.”).
144. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018)
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government compunction to adopt its ideology remains foundational to compelled
speech doctrine.
A doctrine first developed to prevent the State from interfering with private
opinions, political freedoms, religious convictions, and press freedoms has morphed
into a legal tool for challenging economic, health, and labor regulations.145 Where
other fundamental rights are at stake—be they privacy, equality, or association—
contextual judicial analysis should balance free speech concerns, countervailing
interests and objectives, alternatives for communication, fit of regulation with the
stated objective and doctrine, and whether the regulation is authoritarian in
repressing core communications. Formalistic free speech analysis is coarse and
imprecise. It renders constitutionally suspect a range of activities from securities and
antitrust laws, health warnings on labels, and signage in places of public
accommodation. This Part seeks to examine how contextual reasoning could enrich
compelled speech jurisprudence.
A. A Balance of Legal Interests
Any comprehensive view of speech in the United States raises heightened
concerns about government intrusion into the autonomy of private and political
actors. Not all content regulations, however, are subject to strict scrutiny. What’s
more, neither tobacco ads nor antitrust laws receive anything but rational basis
scrutiny, even though they undeniably compel expressive content. Antitrust
regulation favors anti-monopolism and tobacco warning regulation favors public
health. These are not matters raising concerns about ideological suppression, which
would give rise to the highest level of scrutiny. However, a balanced analysis should
apply when communications are incidentally affected by important policies on
matters of substantial government interest in the regulation of commerce and
healthcare. Proportionality is more open to judicial reflection on relevant antiauthoritarian principles protected by the First Amendment, but it distinguishes
protected speech of a personal and public nature from commercial regulations.146
Interpretation requires courts to review constitutional contexts. As Justice
Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent to Manhattan Community Access Corporation
v. Halleck, the context in which a statement is uttered should be considered along
with the actual words allegedly in violation of a law.147 Contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s oft repeated claim, which, as we already saw, appears in cases such as Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, not all content-based restrictions on speech require judges to

(Kagan, J., dissenting).
145. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
146. This form of judicial analysis is consistent with traditional equitable interpretation of
public law dating back to the national founding. See Farah Peterson, Expounding the
Constitution, 130 YALE L.J. 2, 22 (2020) (discussing public law interpretation in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries meant to effectuate the purposes of constitutional
principles).
147. See 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1936 (2019) (“When a person alleges a violation of the right to
free speech, courts generally must consider not only what was said but also in what context it
was said.”).
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engage in the highest level of review. In the words of Justice Breyer, in a partial
concurrence and partial dissent to Iancu v. Brunetti, categorical rules of free speech
doctrine are “rules of thumb.” Choosing an interpretive scheme—be it “commercial
speech,” “government speech,” or similar doctrine—rather than weighing
countervailing government interests creates outcome-determinative rules. As with
other doctrinal categories, those used in compelled speech analyses are necessary
starting points but should not be used to obfuscate judicial reasoning.
In NIFLA, Justice Kennedy in concurrence regarded the public health notice to be
a form of viewpoint discrimination.148 The majority concluded more narrowly that
“professional speech” is not a lesser-protected category of speech.149 From either
perspective, a woman’s fundamental right to privacy did not weigh into these
analyses. The challenge is to articulate an approach that is flexible enough to be
contextual yet rigorous enough to provide judges with guidance on what factors are
most weighty. An examination of whether words on politics, philosophy, art, social
sciences, and history is important to selecting the highest standard of review.150
In a series of decisions, Justice Breyer offered a four-part balancing approach to
smoke out issues relevant to contextual analysis.151 He would balance interests where
the regulation does not interfere with a fundamental concern. Conflicts are inevitable
between the values of speech, safety, privacy, intellectual property, national security,
education, and many other matters that arise during free speech litigation. An
eminent free speech proponent, Alexander Meiklejohn, likewise conceived the First
Amendment to be part of a broader constitutional guarantee of liberty:
In our discussions of the Constitution, we commonly think that the
clearest and most compelling expression of the “idea” of political
freedom is given by the First Amendment. But in theory, and perhaps in
practice, more penetrating insights are given by the Preamble’s
declaration that “We, the people of the United States . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution . . . ,” or by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion
that, while we have delegated some limited governing powers to our
agents, we have reserved other powers to ourselves, or, finally, by the
provision of Article I, Section 2, that we have authority to exercise direct
governing power in electing our representatives.152
Jurisprudence would do well to harken to broader constitutional principles such as
those found in the Preamble to the Constitution and the Declaration of

148. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 2371–72.
150. Whether a particular judicial decision is consistent with the values of deliberative
democracy should variously be judged by synthetic considerations of authoritative text, the
priorities of representative government, doctrinal reflections, informational values, structural
considerations, and rational applications of existing laws. Categories are useful starting points
of analysis. Behind judicial categories, however, should be principles of free speech
protection, especially self-government, self-expression, and the search for truth.
151. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
152. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
264 (1961).
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Independence.153 The Free Speech Clause is relevant to autonomous dignity,
representative government, and equal rights to identify underlying constitutional
principles relevant to the resolution of cases challenging regulations on compelled
speech grounds. However, other constitutional principles may well present
conflicting values that a court must evaluate on balance.
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence to Alvarez, argued for relying on factors of
proportionality. His suggestion applies to cases “warrant[ing] neither near-automatic
condemnation (as ‘strict scrutiny’ implies) nor near-automatic approval (as is
implicit in ‘rational basis’ review).”154 His proportionality test would apply to cases
not involving core protections, which rely on the highest level of scrutiny—
including, self-government and aesthetics. Nor is the test pertinent to the review of
purely economic regulation, but to expressive harms with an incidental effect on
constitutionally relevant speech. He would “examine the fit between statutory ends
and means.”155 This would uncover “speech-related harms, justifications, and
potential alternatives.”156 Justice Breyer found the Court “has taken account of the
seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the nature and
importance of the provision’s countervailing objectives, the extent to which the
provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less
restrictive ways of doing so.”157
Breyer’s proposed test allows for nuance, context, and balancing. Professor
Alexander Aleinikoff calls this the “age of balancing,” as the “predominant method
of constitutional interpretation.”158 In the compelled speech area, following Barnette
and Wooley, a court should be particularly suspect of regulations requiring private
parties to adopt ideological messages. Health, consumer protection, and safety
regulations should be treated differently, however. Those three are areas that
governmental police powers typically provide discretion to advance the general
welfare on local, state, and federal levels. General welfare is a constitutional norm
mandated in the Preamble to the United States Constitution.
The First Amendment guarantees humans entitlement to exercise the innate right
to articulate personal, civic, or descriptive thoughts. The right to express ideas freely,
therefore, is not a grant from government. It is rather an inborn right, call it innate
and unenumerated. The First Amendment mandates the maintenance of safeguards
against arbitrary government compunction that interferes with self-expression.
The core aims of the First Amendment are to protect open assertion, discourse,
and debate. But the Roberts Court’s reliance on compelled speech doctrine perceives
all expressions, except a few low-value categories, as monolithic categories,159 which

153. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS 34–85 (2018) (writing of how the
Declaration of Independence and Preamble have affected U.S. constitutionalism).
154. 567 U.S. at 730–31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 730.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 944 n.2 (1987); see also Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing
and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 160 (2008) (arguing that
proportionality is regarded to be “a foundational element of global constitutionalism”).
159. Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65
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led libertarian-leaning majorities to strike a public health disclosure law in NIFLA, a
collective bargaining law in Janus, and a consumer protection statute in Expressions
Hair Design. This categorical doctrine, which subjects to heighted review laws with
incidental effects on speech, leads to judicial deregulation from the bench. The Court
found unconstitutional laws that compel disclosure of retail charges,160 professional
information,161 and labor negotiations.162 The plasticity of compelled speech doctrine
has shifted from government imposition of ideological views to government
imposition of rules on matters within the legitimate and traditional functions of
government.
B. Primary and Secondary Concerns
When a judge selects what line of precedents fit a case, he or she is neither
engaged in a straightforward, obvious, nor particularly transparent endeavor that the
text of the First Amendment can obviously answer.163 Even where the First
Amendment is of primary judicial concern, considerations of secondary relevance
often have an important role to play in adjudication. These concerns of secondary
relevance are what, in a different context, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
called, “a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations.”164 As Frederick
Schauer has pointed out, judges routinely (and sometimes, I would add,
calculatingly) select doctrinal frameworks—be they public forum, designated public
forum, limited public forum, unconstitutional conditions, or some other doctrine—
to justify contingent judgments and make them appear obvious, objective, and
straightforward.165 In order to give first-order free speech decisions the appearance
of content neutrality, the Supreme Court often fails to flesh out second-order issues
pertinent to the resolution of a case.
I am here relying on Joseph Raz’s distinction between first-order and secondorder judgments.166 The former help resolve disputes intrinsic to a case, such as those
involving free speech concerns, while the latter provide more general reasoning for
judicial outcomes. His definition differs somewhat from mine, perhaps because his

EMORY L.J. 495, 506 (2015).
160. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017).
161. See generally NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
162. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018).
163. The Court has
reject[ed] the view that freedom of speech and association, as protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are ‘absolutes,’ not only in the
undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must
prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered
solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (citation omitted).
164. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
165. Frederick Schauer, Not Just About License Plates: Walker v. Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Government Speech, and Doctrinal Overlap in the First Amendment, 2015 SUP. CT.
REV. 265, 265–66.
166. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 39–40, 46–47 (Princeton Univ. Press
1990) (1975) (discussing first-order and second-order reasons).
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work emerges from the British legal system with its scattered constitutional
provisions, rather than a unified, written constitution as in the United States. By
“second-order judgments,” I refer to general constitutional structure or enumerated
provisions and implicit powers that arise in cases directly or indirectly implicating
speech.
Second-order rules provide broad proportional insights relevant to the resolution
of a dispute involving expressive conduct. This was true in Virginia v. Black, where
the Court discussed the meanings of the burning cross to the Ku Klux Klan. This
helped to contextualize the plurality’s reliance on the true threats doctrine.167
Similarly, Barnette eloquently drew on historical examples—of Roman repression
of Christianity, Inquisition extremes to stamp out dissent, and the Soviet Union
repression to maintain totalitarianism—to highlight humanity’s grave knowledge of
oppressive censorship and political orthodoxy.168
Recent compelled speech decisions, to the contrary, have relied on a categorical,
fairly outcome determinative, method of interpretation. Factors of historical,
structural, normative, and prudential significance are often lost in the forward march
of libertarian doctrine. Lack of transparency is evident also in other areas of the First
Amendment. For instance, the Court’s reliance on the government speech doctrine
in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. stands on shaky
ground.169 As Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea points out, the decision has dangerous
implications in a variety of other areas of free speech jurisprudence.170 In that case,
the Court calls private logos on license plates state speech.171 Consequently, the state
can choose what viewpoint to place on license plates.172 But behind the opinion is a
second-order consideration, one that should have been communicated: a state need
not accept applications to display a badge of oppression, such as the Confederate
battle flag.173
Elsewhere, the categorical reading of the First Amendment held unconstitutional
the Animal Crush Video Act without engaging in second-order reasoning in United
States v. Stevens.174 In this case, the Court elevated speech above the second-order
value against animal cruelty, which all fifty states and the District of Columbia

167. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
168. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
169. 576 U.S. 200 (2015).
170. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1195, 1198
(2016) (dissecting Walker and examining its dangerous implications to matters “from student
speech rights to government employees to advertisements on public transportation”).
171. Walker, 576 U.S. at 214.
172. Id. at 207 (“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from
determining the content of what it says.”).
173. For an extensive discussion of confederate symbols and monuments as badges of
slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment, see Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate
Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539 (2002); Alexander Tsesis,
Confederate Monuments as Badges of Slavery, 108 KY. L.J. 695 (2019).
174. 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (relying on a judicially created scheme of low value speech
categories). For a critique of the Stevens majority’s analytical framework, see Alexander
Tsesis, Multifactoral Free Speech, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1021–24 (2016); Alexander
Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY L.J. 495,
506–14 (2015).
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adopted into their policies.175 The case was decided exclusively on the basis of free
speech principles against viewpoint discrimination without giving any weight to the
obvious national commitment to stop sadistic violence perpetrated against animals.
A lone dissenter gave any serious attention to animal welfare.176
The Court often cites Reed v. Town of Gilbert for the doctrine that strict scrutiny
applies to content-based laws,177 and then, after finding a law to be content based,
applies that rigorous analysis without adequately assessing the primary speech and
secondary policies at stake.178 The Court has relied on the Reed strict scrutiny
standard in a variety of free speech cases—including the compelled speech area of
First Amendment law—to strike regulations without looking at second-order
values.179 As Part II argued, greater balance should have been consequential in
review of women’s privacy in NIFLA, associational rights in Janus, and business
fraud law in Expressions Hair Design.
Relying on strict scrutiny whenever a regulation requires businesses, employers,
and even employees to adopt norms of professional speech dismisses legitimate
incidental second-order legal concerns. In addition, the Roberts Court’s formalism
in the compelled speech area treats economic and professional regulations as if they
were core First Amendment values.180 The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause
“gives each citizen an equal right to self-expression and to participation in selfgovernment.”181 But it has become an arrow in the quiver of opportunistic litigation
strategies designed to challenge economic and workaday regulations.182
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: PROPORTIONALITY BEYOND COMPELLED SPEECH
The categorical application of rules to all forms of compelled disclosure
regulations risks oversimplifying complex legal disputes. Discourse about “political,
social, and other public issues,” as then Justice Rehnquist put it, have a greater First
Amendment value “than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to

175. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 491 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“All 50 States and the District of
Columbia have enacted statutes prohibiting animal cruelty.”).
176. Id. at 491–99 (Alito, J., dissenting).
177. 576 U.S. 155, 163–64. The rigidity of Reed’s algorithmic analysis of content
regulations was determinative in a plurality relying on its absolute holding that judges should
rely on strict scrutiny whenever reviewing content regulations. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol.
Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
178. See NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018)
179. See, e.g., id. (striking a compelled speech law); Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2346–47 (relying
on strict scrutiny to strike the “debt-collection” provision of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (plurality opinion) (finding
unconstitutional the “disparaging” clause of the Lanham Act).
180. See generally, Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
1015 (2015) (discussing leading theories of First Amendment interpretation).
181. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. Examples of this legal strategy opportunistically relying on the First Amendment are
found in Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1619–20 (2015).
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purchase one or another kind of shampoo.”183 Openly weighing private and public
interests, means-ends analysis, constitutional norms against ideological orthodoxy,
and alternative speech assessment of how to achieve legitimate regulatory policy is
critical to judicial transparency, public scrutiny, and predictability of free speech
jurisprudence.184
It should be readily acknowledged that balancing is not without its own risks. As
with categorical reasoning, proportionality can be oversimplified and exploited for
ideological purposes. Justices on the right and left of the ideological spectrum agree
that the First Amendment primarily protects expressions of self-government, selfexpression, and edification. These constitutionally recognized forms of core free
speech differ from commercial communications, which may be important to
audiences but lack the same compelling First Amendment interests. Regulations on
areas of law that have traditionally been left to states—including healthcare,
consumer protection, labor, and safety regulations—should not be treated on a par
with speech guaranteed under the Free Speech Clause.
Categories are essential rules of thumb,185 but they should not be substitutes for
judicial reasoning. Each case, as Justice Brennan wrote, requires “careful
consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression.”186 Context
is essential to fair adjudication of cases. Instead of weighing relevant interests, the
Roberts Court discounted regulatory interests in Expressions Hair Designs, NIFLA,
and Janus. The laws struck in those cases did not require merchants, pregnancy crisis
centers, or unions to adopt the government’s social or political ideologies.
The contextual method this Article calls for is by no means novel. Professor Vicki
Jackson concludes that proportionality offers “some hope for more careful, and open,
reasoning about constitutional values.”187 Balanced analysis of constitutional values
is the staple of interpretation throughout the world. European countries, including
Germany and Estonia, and distant countries as diverse as Canada, New Zealand,
South Africa, Israel, and Switzerland rely on proportionate analysis.188

183. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 787
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
184. For example, the Court has said that free speech adjudication depends on a careful
balance “between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High
Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Furthermore, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), established a classic test for protecting speech through balancing of factors. The Court
has also relied on balancing in symbolic speech cases, among others. See United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
185. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting
in part) (“I believe we would do better to treat this Court’s speech-related categories not as
outcome-determinative rules, but instead as rules of thumb.”).
186. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (finding unconstitutional a flag burning
statute).
187. Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT.
803, 834 (2004) (book review).
188. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 74 (2008); Carlos Bernal Pulido, The
Migration of Proportionality Across Europe, 11 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 483, 499 (2013).
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Balanced adjudication examines the fit of a statute to private and public interests
at stake in a case. Proportionality recognizes analytic particularity based on the
specific regulation and its effect on communication. Judicial reasoning in the
compelled speech area should be transparent where conflicting legal interests are at
play, not based on the perfunctory absolute statement of Reed on speech and content
neutrality. The highest scrutiny should be reserved for open debate, personal
expression, and the quest for knowledge. Free speech principles should be analyzed
on balance, however, with policies for apprising consumers about accurate product
costs, directing patients to state available medical assistance, and bargaining for
terms of public employment.

Judges in European Union countries rely on proportionality as an adjudicatory principle meant
to establish reasonable constitutional limits.

